Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2022

Religion, the Framers, and the Death Penalty: How Does a
Canvassing of Religion at the Time of the Founding Inform the
Debates Surrounding the Eighth Amendment’s Original Meaning
as it Pertains to the Death Penalty?
Thomas C. Mizzone

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

INTRODUCTION
It is undisputable that the death penalty is contentious.1 From this reality extends a
ferocious scholarly debate concerning the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause—primarily revolving around its original meaning—and the death penalty.2 Indeed, one
would likely be hard pressed to identify a similarly brief text in American history (sixteen words)
that has been debated so intensely by legal scholars and law professors,3 practicing lawyers,4
innumerable judges,5 and members of the public.6 The debate is often intertwined with life-ordeath implications, which means that it has played out in scholarly articles, federal and state
courts, and, of course, in the Supreme Court of the United States.7
There are two competing groups of scholars and jurists in the Eighth Amendment’s
“original meaning” arena: originalists and living originalists.8 Originalists interpret the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause based on how it was to be interpreted and
applied during the late 1700s, when it was written,9 and as such, hold fast to the idea that the
death penalty cannot be unconstitutional, because the Eighth Amendment was adopted at a time
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John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition
Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 254 (2009).
2
Id.
3
Compare RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT’S OBSTACLE COURSE 1-6 (1982) (arguing that
Furman v. Georgia was wrongly decided insomuch as it held that the death penalty was a “cruel and unusual”
punishment), with HUGO ADAM BEDAU, KILLING AS PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 91 (2004) (arguing that a moral interpretation of the Eight Amendment renders the death penalty
unconstitutional).
4
See, e.g., COLIN DAYAN, THE STORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (2007).
5
Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (holding that the Constitution’s text makes apparent that
capital punishment was widely accepted by the Framers during the time of ratification), with Kevin M. Barry, The
Law of Abolition, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 521, 523 (2017) (for more than half of a century, thirty-five or
more state and federal judges believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional per se).
6
See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Opinion, In America; Cruel and Unusual, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2001),
https://nyti.ms/2IByrwG.
7
John D. Bessler, A Century in the Making: the Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, and the Origins of
the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, 27 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 989, 990-91 (2019).
8
Id. at 990.
9
Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 580 (1998).
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in which the death penalty was widely imposed and socially accepted.10 Contrarily, living
originalists typically believe that the death penalty could be unconstitutional, arguing that the
Framers intended the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to embody an “abstract moral
prohibition of cruelty,”11 and therefore “it is up to each generation to decide for itself which
practices violate that principle.”12 Though not the focus of this article, there is also a morals
component to the debate, of which scholars should at least be aware when studying the death
penalty and its debates.13 It is straightforward: those who would abolish the death penalty believe
that it is an immoral or unethical form of punishment, whereas those who wish to retain the death
penalty believe the opposite.14
Originalist or living originalist, abolitionist or not, all can likely agree that the discussion
around the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is extremely
contentious, and has accordingly occupied innumerable hours of legal thought and scholarship.15
The Role of Religion in the “Original Meaning” Death Penalty Debate
This article seeks to see what happens when religion—that existed at the time of the
adoption of the Eighth Amendment—is thrown into the midst of these originalism debates, and
how the religious realities at the time of the founding, when compared and contrasted with the
beliefs and views of the founders, inform the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment as it
relates to the death penalty. There are already a slew of considerations that both parties take into
account when assessing the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, including its plain
language, and historical references and documents, such as the Bill of Rights or even the
10

John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 531, 535 (2014).
Id. at 536.
12
Id.
13
See Kevin Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part I): The Eighth Amendment Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death
Penalty, 66 FLA. L. REV. 313, 332 (2014).
14
Id.
15
See Bessler, supra note 1, at 254.
11

2

English’s Declaration of Rights.16 The justifications for assigning a role to religion in the death
penalty debates are commonsense. Justice William O. Douglas once observed that “we are a
religious people.”17 This observation held true for the American public of the eighteenthcentury,18 and it clearly holds true for Americans today.19 Moreover, many of the Constitution’s
Framers, Founding Fathers, and men involved in the writing of the Eighth Amendment (the men
who provided the kindling for original meaning debates in the first place), had strong views on
religion.20 Therefore, because religion permeated some of the Founders’ views and certainly
those of the general public in the late 1700s, an originalist analysis of the death penalty, which so
innately involves morality (which for many is tied to religion21), would be remiss without at least
an inquiry into the beliefs of mainstream religions and Framers at the time of the founding.
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Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
18
Religion and the Founding of the American Republic, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel02.html (between seventy-five to eighty percent of the population of
eighteenth-century America attended church).
19
Polls have consistently demonstrated that Americans are highly religious in nature.
17

A Gallup poll from December, 1999 found that “almost nine out of ten Americans (86%) say that they believe in
God, even when given the choice of saying that they ‘don’t believe in God, but believe in a universal spirit or higher
power.’” Frank Newport, Americans Remain Very Religious, But Not Necessarily in Conventional Ways, THE
GALLUP ORGANIZATION (Dec. 24, 1999), http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/r991224.asp.
Now, a recent Gallup poll from 2018 found that of the Americans polled, “72% say religion is important in their
lives, including 51% who say it is very important.” Despite the fact that this is lower than Gallup’s 1999 poll,
American religiosity remains at high levels. Megan Brenan, Religion Considered Important to 72% of Americans,
THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION (Dec. 24, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/245651/religion-considered-importantamericans.aspx.
In addition, American religiosity can withstand strife. A 2020 Gallup poll found that 48% of Americans said religion
is very important in their lives, 25% rated it “fairly important” and 27% “not very important.” The poll found that
“although the coronavirus pandemic has wreaked havoc on many aspects of Americans’ lives in the past year, it did
not alter the importance of religion in their lives.” While this poll is lower than 2018, the result is undeniable:
religion play a crucial aspect in Americans’ lives. Megan Brenan, Religiosity Largely Unaffected by Events of 2020
in U.S., THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION (Mar. 29, 2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/341957/religiosity-largelyunaffected-events-2020.aspx.
20
C.f. A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 93 (1985) (Like many of the Founding Fathers,
James Madison was deeply religious—his “‘idea of religion ... was one of a highly personal relationship between the
individual and his maker.’”).
21
Noah Feldman, Religion and Morality in the Public Square: Religion and Morality in the Public Square: Excerpts
from Keynote Address, 22 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 417, 425 (2007).
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A Brief Overview of this Article
Part IA of this article discusses the Eighth Amendment’s history, including its adoption,
ratification, and application during the colonial era, as well as some legal discourse on the Eighth
Amendment’s major players. Part IB explores seminal Supreme Court cases to get a grasp on the
state of death penalty jurisprudence, the Court’s methodology, the judicial originalism debate,
and how the Court defines the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’s key terms, specifically,
“cruel” and “unusual.”
Part II revisits the two main sides of the debate (i.e., the Originalists versus the Living
Originalists) in greater depth. It provides a full-fledged statement of modern scholarship on the
death penalty debates, and the analyses used by each group of scholars to arrive at their
conclusions as to the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning as it pertains to the death penalty.
Once the Eighth Amendment’s history, jurisprudence, and modern scholarship have been
established as they pertain to its original meaning, Part IIIA creates a religious backdrop at the
time of the founding. It canvasses a number of the religious groups that existed at the time of the
founding, but focuses on the mainstream groups that existed in the late 1700s, and those groups’
beliefs pertaining to capital punishment. Part IIIB drills down into the Eighth Amendment’s
prominent Framers and notable Founding Fathers to bring out their religions and views on the
death penalty.22 Part IIIC discusses lead orators and thinkers who were involved or asserted an
influential opinion during the eighteenth-century, and draws out their religious beliefs and views
regarding the propriety of the death penalty.
Lastly, Part IV—the heart of the article—compares and synthesizes Parts IB, II, and III,
to determine whether religion and the article’s findings add anything new to the debates. By

22

Relying on inferences or, where available, discussion of explicit references or quotes of their views.
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synthesizing these three sections, it can be seen that a canvassing of religions at the time of the
founding and their beliefs pertaining to the death penalty sheds new light on the “originalmeaning of the Eighth Amendment” debates in that it manifests a difference in what the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause meant to the enactors of the Eighth Amendment, versus what it
meant to the general public. This public-view/enactor-view dichotomy raises some potential
concerns with traditional originalism, and unearths potential areas for future study to continue to
shed light on the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning.
PART I: AN OVERVIEW, HISTORY, AND THE COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE
A. Adoption and Ratification by the First Congress, and Prominent Advocates
To obtain an adequate grasp of the Eighth Amendment’s adoption by Congress in 1789
and subsequent ratification in 1791, it is important to understand the full-scale ratification event
at the time: the adoption of the Bill of Rights. During the Virginia Ratification Convention in
1788, a fierce fight ensued, the Federalists versus the Anti-Federalists,23 the latter complaining
that the proposed Constitution’s biggest shortcoming was the absence of a bill of rights.24 Due to
these concerns, some wondered if the Constitution would be ratified.25 Patrick Henry and George
Mason,26 serving as the lead orators opposing the Constitution’s adoption absent a bill of rights,
were particularly concerned about the use of “torturing to extort a confession.”27 Due to their

23

Note that Virginia was not the only state to propose such an amendment: Rhode Island, North Carolina, New
York, and Pennsylvania all included Eighth Amendment-resembling provisions in their respective ratification
conventions. Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 127
(2004).
24
Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP.
L. REV. 661, 676 (2004).
25
Id.
26
John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause, 97 VA. L. REV.
899, 944 (2011).
27
Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 44748, available at: https://memory.loc.gov/ll/lled/003/0400/04590447.tif.
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strong advocacy, a compromise was reached between the two parties, and Madison, a staunch
Federalist, agreed to recommend such an amendment, contingent upon Henry, Mason and their
allies voting to ratify the constitution as it was.28 Thus, during the Virginia Ratification
Convention in 1788, the body endorsed the Constitution, but conditioned its approval on the
group of proposed amendments, which were described as “a declaration or bill of rights.”29
James Madison remained true to his word, and during the close of the first Congressional
Meeting of 1789,30 Madison submitted a proposal to the House for the amendments.31 A
considerable majority of the U.S. House of Representatives agreed to Madison’s proposal, the
U.S. Senate concurred, and thus the resolution was passed that “excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”32
The Eighth Amendment received sparse attention by Congress during the legislative
processes.33 During the first Congressional Sessions, only two comments were made pertaining
to the Eighth Amendment.34 The first observed that the amendment was problematic because it
prohibited punishments which were accepted at that time.35 The second stated that the
amendment was too vague, and therefore meaningless.36 In fact, throughout Congress’s First
Session (March to September 1789), criminal law issues were hardly addressed at all, and when
they were, they were given merely tangential treatment,37 as our country’s “most basic
constitutional criminal procedure tenets” were not proposed by Madison until the end of the first

28

Rumann, supra note 24, at 677.
Claus, supra note 23, at 127.
30
Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts about the Department of Justice’s Role,
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 360 (2004).
31
Rumann, supra note 24, at 679.
32
The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins 928 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015).
33
Rumann, supra note 24, at 679.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Little, supra note 30, at 361.
29

6

session, and the “substantive definition of federal crimes and their punishment” were left
unaddressed until the Second Congressional Session in January of 1790.38
In its Second Session during January 1790, the First Congress began work on the early
drafts for a federal criminal code. This birthed Congress’s extensive “Act for the Punishment of
Certain Crimes Against the United States” (the Act), which defined the federal offenses of
piracy, forgery, treason, and murder, and prescribed a punishment of death upon conviction.39 In
addition, the Act listed death as a punishment for other esoteric federal offenses.40 All-in-all,
approximately twelve federal offenses included a death penalty as punishment.41 In contrast to
the minimal treatment afforded the Eighth Amendment and its provisions, the death penalty
provoked significant debate and conversation during Congress’s second meeting.42 Indeed, the
death penalty provisions from the Act sparked the only “reported debate” pertaining to the crime
bill in either House.43 One debate concerned a “dissection provision” which James Madison
supported, that would permit surgeons to dissect executed criminals’ bodies.44 The second
concerned whether or not the death penalty was appropriate for “passing counterfeit currency.”45
Finally, in addition to the debates, the First Congress officially identified the method of
execution in crimes carrying the death penalty as “hanging the person convicted by the neck until
dead.”46

38

Id.
Id. at 362-63.
40
Other federal offenses which were punishable by death included: “offenses committed on the high seas when
punishable by death ‘if committed within the body of a county;’ violent acts committed on a ship’s commander to
hinder defense of the ship or its goods; ‘making a revolt in the ship;’ ‘any act of hostility against the United States,
or any citizen thereof, upon the high sea under colour of authority from any foreign prince or state;” aiding and
abetting piracy; assisting forgery or uttering forged public securities; and rescue or freeing of anyone convicted of a
federal capital offense.” Id. at n.66.
41
Id. at 363.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 364.
46
Id. at 365.
39
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In 1791, just a year or so after the Eighth Amendment’s ratification and adoption by the
First Congress, the death penalty was imposed widely across the states.47 The states evenly
followed the common-law tradition of prescribing death as a mandatory penalty for specific
offenses, even though the spectrum of such offenses in America was rather limited in
comparison to the over 200 offenses which were “punishable by death in England” at the time.48
Thus, as death penalty scholar Rory K. Little put it, “the federal death penalty . . . has been part
of our national structure since our country’s earliest origins.”49
B. The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Address the Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
Per Se, and its Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause Jurisprudence
The U.S. Supreme Court has left the pointed question of the per se constitutionality of the
death penalty largely unaddressed since the 1970s.50 During the 1970s there were four major
Supreme Court decisions that addressed the death penalty’s constitutionality squarely:51
McGautha v. California,52 Furman v. Georgia,53 Gregg v. Georgia,54 and Woodson v. North
Carolina.55 This section will cover the holdings of each case briefly to get a feel for the contours
of Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence (addressing its per se constitutionality), and then
move on to the Court’s definitions of the Eighth Amendment’s terms, which continue to play a
part in the modern scholarly debates on the death penalty discussed in Part II.

47

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976).
Id.
49
Little, supra note 30, at 365.
50
John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1913, 1913 (2012).
51
Id.
52
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
53
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
54
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
55
428. U.S. 280.
48
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(1) Landmark Decisions
First, in its landmark decision in 1971 in McGautha v. California, the Court held that the
jury—who imposed the death penalty without a set of governing standards—did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 Next, in 1972, the Court birthed Furman v.
Georgia, where it in application reversed its McGautha v. California holding, holding that the
death sentences (as applied) were unconstitutional, based on its interpretation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.57 In reaching its per curiam five-to-four decision, the Court struck
down death penalty legislation as violations of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.58 In nine
separate opinions, the Justices voiced a handful of reasons for the decision, ranging from the
arbitrary nature of death sentences to the racial prejudice or inequality that accompanied many of
the executions.59 In 1976, just four years later, the Court reversed course again through the
vehicle of Gregg v. Georgia (plus two companion cases), once more approving the death penalty
as a form of punishment for certain offenses.60 The primary driver of this flip-flop was the fact
that thirty-five states enacted death penalty legislation in the timespan immediately following
Furman.61 Specifically, the Court held that it was constitutionally permissible for laws to provide
guidance to the ordinarily unbridled discretion of capital juries by requiring them to make special
findings, or balance “mitigating” versus “aggravating” circumstances.62 The Court refined its
analysis later that year in Woodson v. North Carolina, and established that mandatory death

56

McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 309-10.
60
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153 (1976).
61
JOHN D. BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH: AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 60 (2003).
62
Bessler, supra note 50, at 1914.
57
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sentences, which were commonplace during the time of the Framers in Colonial America, were
unconstitutional and “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.”63
Since this rapid-fire spurt of cases in the 1970s, the question of whether the death penalty
could again be unconstitutional per se has been left unaddressed, and, one could argue,
intentionally skirted around by the Supreme Court’s Justices.64 The bottom line is that while the
Nation’s highest Court has, since the 1970s, reevaluated permissible methods of executions,65 it
has more consistently upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty, and “allowed death
sentences for those who kill or show a ‘reckless indifference to the value of human life.’”66
(2) Methodology and Terms
The Eighth Amendment is decidedly brief.67 In fact, the Amendment is only sixteen
words long: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”68 Despite its brevity, the Amendment’s legal interpretation
remains contentious among courts and scholars.69 For the scope and purposes of this article, it is
only necessary to understand the Supreme Court’s understanding of six words, which make up

63

Id.
Id. at 1916 (“Instead of focusing on whether executions are ‘cruel’ and have become ‘unusual’ as a factual and
legal matter, the Justices have preferred to leave the issue of capital punishment largely to juries, legislative bodies,
and executive branch officials.”).
64

Indeed, even though the Justices have been presented with “credible statistical proof” showcasing a “persistent
pattern of racial bias in capital sentencing proceedings,” they consistently refuse to strike down the death penalty as
unconstitutional. Id.
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court came the closest to reevaluating the death penalty since its 1970s line of cases, in
Baze v. Rees. Id. at 1917. The decision instigated a halt in executions around the country, as all waited for the
decision to be handed down. Unsurprisingly, the Court rejected the inmates claims that Kentucky’s lethal injection
protocol was unethical in that there was a potential for high levels of pain. The Court held that the inmates failed to
carry their burden “of showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal injection
protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives, constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.
65
Id. at 1918 (The Supreme Court has reconsidered and even reevaluated “the constitutionality of certain types of
executions.”).
66
Id. at 1919 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)).
67
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
68
Id.
69
Bessler, supra note 1, at 254.
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the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause: “. . . nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”70
From the Eighth Amendment’s inception, the Court’s Justices have—particularly its originalist
Justices—worried about and been unable to dispositively discern the “original meaning” of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.71 Meaning, the Court has not been able to definitively
determine what the terms of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause meant to the eighteenthcentury Americans that adopted the Amendment.72
For over half of a century, the Court has employed the “Evolving Standards of Decency
Test” in its Cruel and Unusual Punishments jurisprudence.73 The test was originally articulated
by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, where the Court first had to officially decide what the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause meant.74 In that case, the nonoriginalist plurality decided
that “rather than tying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to the outdated standards of
the past . . . , the Clause ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.’”75 This methodology, which plainly allows for an
expansive and fluid interpretation of the Eighth Amendment,76 received pushback, of course,
from the Court’s traditional originalists, and notably, the late Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice
Scalia’s fairly “bright-line” approach, articulated in Baze v. Rees and quite opposite to Warren’s
view, states: “if a punishment was acceptable in 1791, it must be acceptable today;” conversely,
if a punishment “was considered unacceptably cruel in 1791, it must be unacceptably cruel

70

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation,
102 NW. U.L. REV. 1739, 1743 (2008).
72
C.f. Id. at 1748-49.
73
Id. at 1749.
74
Id.
75
Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002)).
76
See Id. at 1758 (arguing the interpretation is “unduly” expansive).
71
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today.”77 This view results in a considerably more narrow and static interpretation of the
Amendment.78
While this judicial tension that accompanies the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
makes it difficult to plainly state the Court’s legal definitions of the Clause’s terms, the Court
has, in a few of its prominent death penalty cases, given somewhat straightforward explanations
of how it views the words “cruel” and “unusual.”79 For example, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court
described a “cruel” punishment as a “harsh punishment, one that inflicts suffering,” and one “so
totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”80
Interestingly, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court seemingly erased the word “unusual” from the
Amendment, stating that it has little independent significance from the word “cruel,” thus
tethering it to “cruel.”81 Nevertheless, in more recent decisions, such as Ewing v. California, the
Court treated “unusual” as its own word, distinct from “cruel,” in upholding a punishment that
was alleged to be “unusual.”82
As demonstrated by the diversity of perspectives on the Court, the Eighth Amendment’s
legal interpretation remains contentious among the Judiciary—the views of the originalists are
always in tension with those of the nonoriginalists, particularly in light of Scalia’s mighty
shadow still hovering over the Court.83 Such tensions (or similar), which run back to Trop v.
Dulles,84 seem to manifest themselves when the Court’s waffles back and forth in the 1970s on
the death penalty’s per se constitutionality. As is about to be seen, the tensions in the Judiciary

77

Stinneford, supra note 10, at 544.
See Stinneford, supra note 71, at 1742.
79
Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 475, 481 (2005).
80
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (Powell, Stewart, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
81
Stacy, supra note 79, at n.45.
82
C.f. Id. at 487.
83
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). Baze was only decided a little over a decade ago, in 2008, where Scalia again
articulated his bright-line rule.
84
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
78
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are reflected in the modern scholarly debates of the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning—
except that in the academic arena, the debates are battled out perhaps even more viciously.
PART II: THE MODERN-DAY DEATH PENALTY DEBATES
A Brief Overview: Traditional Originalism Versus Living Originalism
Somewhere along the way, scholars became aware that there is something inherently
awry with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence:85 disarray;86 incoherent; ineffectual; a mess;
embarrassing; and, last but not least, a train wreck—these are the choice adjectives employed by
legal commentators to describe the Supreme Court’s handling of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.87 Given the split of views on the Court regarding the original meaning of
the Eighth Amendment as it pertains to the death penalty, and the ambiguous caselaw these
views have produced,88 it is understandable that scholars think so lowly of the Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence. It may be even less of a stretch to realize why the original meaning
debates have gripped the academic and scholarly communities.
The original meaning death penalty debate primarily fixates on determining if the death
penalty could be unconstitutional, “consistent with the original meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.”89 As touched upon earlier, there are two scholarly camps when it
comes to ascertaining the Clause’s original meaning: Justice Scalia’s “traditional originalist”
claim, that because at the time the Eighth Amendment was enacted society accepted the death
penalty widely, and the Clause was meant to “embody the moral perceptions” of that time, the
death penalty must also be constitutional today; and then the claim made by “living

85

Stinneford, supra note 71, at 1740.
Stacy, supra note 79, at 476.
87
Stinneford, supra note 71, at 1740.
88
See Id.
89
Stinneford, supra note 10, at 535.
86
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originalists,”90 that the Eighth Amendment was meant by the Framers to “embody an abstract
moral prohibition of cruelty,” and that each generation must independently decide which
practices violate this prohibition.91 The section serves to provide a detailed statement of the
analyses used by each side.
A. Camp One: Scalia and Traditional Originalism
The more traditional originalism, the originalism of Justice Scalia, advocates that without
constitutional amendment, the death penalty cannot be unconstitutional—at least not if the Court
is to remain true to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’s original meaning.92 Broadly
speaking, and as touched upon in Part I, under Justice Scalia’s originalism, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause needs to be “assigned the meaning” that it had for the people at the
time the Clause was adopted.93 In addition to this pure originalist foundation, Scalia bolsters the
analysis with “longstanding societal traditions.”94 Scalia’s approach therefore combines
traditional originalism and societal tradition.95 This subpart sets forth some of the materials
Scalia and his followers use to arrive at their conclusion that the death penalty must be
constitutional.
Such materials which inform Scalia’s originalism analysis are best set out in his opinion
in Harmelin v. Michigan.96 Though the opinion consists of several parts, the one that is relevant
to this article is Scalia’s originalist-societal tradition analysis, affectionately referred to by some
as his “originalist Eighth Amendment manifesto,”97 which best lays out the views of the

90

Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 536.
92
Id. at 539-40.
93
Stacy, supra note 79, at 507.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Craig S. Lerner, Justice Scalia’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Failure of Sake-of-Argument
Originalism, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 91 137, 137 (2019).
97
Id. at 140.
91

14

traditional originalists. Harmelin concerned a life sentence, without parole, that was mandatorily
imposed as part of a scheme wherein the sentencer was deprived of discretion due to the nature
of the crime (drug trafficking).98 In analyzing the constitutionality of Harmelin’s mandatory
death sentence, Scalia first turned to determining whether mandatory death sentences existed and
were prevalent at the founding era.99 In line with classic traditional originalism, he asserted that
though severe mandatory sentences could be cruel, they are certainly not unusual, citing
historical evidence that they abounded in the first Penal Code, and were incredibly common in
the states at the founding.100
In addition to his initial determination on mandatory sentences, Scalia had to address
whether the Eighth Amendment contains a “proportionality” guarantee.101 Scalia drew from the
English Declaration of Rights of 1689, stating that there is “no doubt” that it is the “antecedent of
our constitutional text.”102 He explained how the Federal Bill of Rights closely mirrors the
English Declaration of Rights, and that the Eighth Amendment’s entire text is taken “almost
verbatim” from it, “which provided ‘that excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive
Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.’”103 Scalia postulated that “the
Americans of 1791” could have understood the Clause to mean that which it meant to the
Englishmen of 1689, and that at the very least the English’s Declaration is “relevant” to the
analysis.104 To then discover what it might have meant to Englishmen at the time, he forged into
various contemporaneous incidents, referencing in particular the case of Titus Oates in 1685, to
understand whether the English Houses of Lords and Commons considered there to be a
98
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“proportionality” requirement.105 Scalia brought in other contemporaneous discussions, one
which was an actual interpretation of the English “cruell and unusuall Punishments” Clause, 106
to conclude that the Clause was not meant to “forbid ‘disproportionate’ punishments,” and that it
was not “‘one of the traditional rights and privileges of Englishmen,’” because at that time, a
“punishment [was] not considered objectionable because it [was] disproportionate,” but
effectively because it was “illegal” or “unusual” or “contrary to Law and ancient practice.”107
In wrapping up, Scalia slyly tied this analysis to eighteenth-century America, stating that
early American Eighth Amendment commentary “contains no reference to disproportionate or
excessive sentences,” and “indicates that it was designed to outlaw particular modes of
punishment.”108 He further supported this finding by referencing what he believed to be “perhaps
the most persuasive evidence” of the Clause’s original meaning: early judicial decisions which,
based on their constructions of the provision, “considered a punishment’s proportionality to be
irrelevant.”109 Scalia and the majority used this stew of historical references, contemporaneous
examples, and founding materials to conclude that Eighth Amendment’s original meaning does
not include a “guarantee against disproportionate sentences.”110
Harmelin and its reasoning and medley of historical references which the Court relied
upon is the posterchild of traditional originalism, as embraced by Justice Scalia and his
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followers.111 Despite the wide variety of documents and contemporaneous accounts that Scalia
relies upon, the word religion appears only once in the Harmelin opinion, and it has absolutely
nothing to do with the Court’s analysis. Does this come as a surprise, given the extreme
religiosity of Americans and its utter pervasiveness on American life,112 and the death penalty’s
innately moral and, for many, religious nature?113 Or is religion properly pushed to the side, and
excluded?
B. Camp Two: The Living Originalists
The prominence of Scalia and his followers has unearthed a group of scholars and jurists
that profess a competing view of originalism, sometimes known as “living originalism,” or
“semantic originalism,” or “text and principle” originalism.114 Scholars who subscribe to living
originalism—such as Michael Perry, Jack Balkin, and Ronald Dworkin—assert that it is possible
for the death penalty to be unconstitutional consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause’s original meaning.115 This subpart, much like the one which preceded it, sets forth a
statement of their views.
Ronald Dworkin summarized the views of living originalists well: the Constitution’s
“right-granting clauses should be read to say what those who made them intended to say,” but do
not need to “be understood to have the consequences that those who made them expected them to
have.”116 This reading provides the Clause with a bit of wiggle room because, said differently,
the thrust of living originalism is that society is bound by the text’s original meaning, but not
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always by the “original expected application.”117 Rather than being tethered to the original
expected application, living originalists believe that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment’s Clause
(and other such constitutional clauses) “should be applied in accordance with contemporary
values and expectations.”118 An originalist analysis with an evolving or living application is, of
course, a glaring contrast to the views of Scalia and his followers—who would say that (taking
thumbscrew torture as an example) because the people who existed at the time the Bill of Rights
was enacted specifically understood the Clause to preclude thumbscrew torture, such methods of
torture could never be constitutional today, even if modern society were to approve of it. The
living originalist view does not give heed to what the Framers or American public thought of a
particular act or punishment, and certainly does not per se forbid such punishments, but instead
cares about those punishments that the society of today finds to be cruel and unusual.119
Professor John Stinneford aptly points out that the living originalist approach to
interpreting the constitution may be founded upon an “implicit natural law conception” that
“some punishments ‘are in fact’ cruel and unusual and some are not.” Building on this, living
originalists believe that founding-era Americans did not “occupy a privileged ground from which
to discern what natural law requires.”120 Accordingly, living originalists assert that Americans
should be able to revisit the Constitution’s natural law concepts and apply them based on
contemporary understandings and experiences. If society now believes that the death penalty is
cruel and unusual, it can declare it unconstitutional.121
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To support their claim that the original meaning was meant to be flexible, living
originalists point to the Clause’s use of abstract moral language.122 They contrast the Clause’s
language with some of the Constitution’s plain rules: the president needs to be, at the very least,
thirty-five years of age;123 the Senators that compose the United States Senate must come in sets
of two from each state;124 the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause simply says: “don’t be
cruel.”125 Living originalists thus assert that abstract moral reasoning is the only fitting way
honor the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’s original meaning, in accordance with the
Clause’s abstract moral language.126 They say that the Bill of Rights’ enactors could have easily
composed a list of punishments they felt were cruel and therefore prohibited.127 Thus, the
capstone of their arguments is that the intentional use of abstract moral language manifests that
the Clause was not supposed to be constrained by the expectations of the people of 1791.128
Summarizing the Debate and each Side’s Strengths and Weaknesses
At face value, one approach to the constitutional interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
and the death penalty is not necessarily better than the other, and both have benefits and
detriments. For example, the primary benefit to Justice Scalia’s approach is that it safeguards
certain constitutional values, such as popular sovereignty and entrenchment.129 The main
detriment, however—as Justice Scalia himself acknowledges—is that “cultural values really do
change over time,” and an analysis that does not account for this may be inadequate.130 On the
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other hand, the main benefit to the living originalists’ views is that social change can be taken
into account when formulating constitutional doctrine, while purportedly remaining true to the
Clause’s original abstract language, which is attractive.131 The detriment to the living
originalists’ approach stems from difficulty in application: it is incredibly difficult to apply
abstract moral reasoning in concrete, real-life cases today, particularly at the end of a century in
which the majority of jurists have explicitly shunned natural law thinking.132 Does one approach
make more sense than the other? Could either of these analyses of the Amendment’s original
meaning be a bit incomplete, or off-base?
PART III: EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY RELIGION AND THE FOUNDERS
A Brief Overview
This section now surveys the religious backdrop at the time of the founding by
canvassing the religious groups that existed at that time, and laying out their views on the death
penalty. Next, it matches up some of the Eighth Amendment’s prominent players and outspoken
founders to their respective religions, which allows for inferences to be drawn regarding their
views on the death penalty. Lastly, this section briefly investigates some of the lead orators and
influences at the time of the framing, and digs into their views on the death penalty.
A. The Religious Backdrop at the Time of the Founding (The American Public’s Religion)
(1) The Puritans
The Puritans were the predominant protestant religious group in New England at the time
of the framing.133 Located primarily in the Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Bay
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areas, the Puritans left England and “High-Church Anglicanism” to achieve greater religious
freedom, to “follow God as they understood Him.”134 The Puritans’ following was large,135 and
was focused on rejecting the traditional tenets of “Church of England” religion in favor of a
congregation-lead church.136
The Puritans, particularly those who settled in Connecticut and Massachusetts, were not
shy in voicing their immense support for a death penalty.137 This was in large part due to their
view of themselves as “children of Israel.”138 This belief influenced the Puritans during the
establishment of their new society in America, and, accordingly, they based many of their capital
crimes on those laid out in the Mosaic law, such as the capital crime compilation found in the
Torah.139 In fact, the Massachusetts Code of 1648, which contained a “long list of capital
crimes,” is, in certain parts, almost verbatim with the Mosaic law.140 Notably, heresy, the act of
defying the leading religious establishment (in this case, Puritanism), was a capital crime.141
In addition to the Puritans’ reliance on the Mosaic law in shaping their stance on the
death penalty, it must be underscored that in Puritan New England, executions served important
civil and religious roles.142 Executions—which were conducted in public, with both the clergy
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and the magistrates heavily involved—performed the “social function of deterring others from
like behavior and the religious function of inducing repentance and expiating the evil that had
polluted the community.”143 Sermons typically preceded the executions, in which clergy
preached to the guilty and to the general public to both encourage repentance and, importantly
here, explain the “divine requirements of execution.”144 Such “execution sermons” attached a
religious weight to the Puritans’ executions and shaped the way the community looked at the
death penalty.145 Thus, the Puritans gladly put citizens to death for a variety of capital crimes
based on their self-identification as children of Israel, and the religious significance they attached
to the act of execution.
(2) The Presbyterians
At the time of the founding, most of the House of Delegates’ evangelical members were
Presbyterians.146 The Presbyterians absolutely resented the Anglican Church and its dominance
in Virginia.147 John Witherspoon, perhaps the most prominent Presbyterian representative at the
time, was the tutor of James Madison who also signed the Declaration of Independence.148
While Witherspoon’s and the Presbyterians’ beliefs pertaining to the death penalty at the
time of the founding are not explicitly laid out, it is known that Witherspoon was a Federalist.149
Federalists, as discussed in Part I, were engaged in a debate with the Anti-Federalists, arguing
that a bill of rights was not needed.150 From this fact it is appears permissible to infer that the
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Presbyterians, represented by leaders such as the Federalist John Witherspoon, were either
indifferent about the death penalty or for it—but certainly not against it.
(3) The Quakers
The presence the Quakers may have lacked in New England was made up for by their
dominance in the middle colonies, Pennsylvania, West Jersey, and Delaware.151 The Quakers—a
liberal religious group—subscribed to human and divine nature theologies that focused on “god’s
goodness” and the “human capacity for moral improvement,” rather than the Calvinist’s
emphasis on human depravity and God’s judgment.152
The Quakers were one of the few religious groups on the forefront of death penalty
opposition during the revolutionary era.153 The driving force behind their opposition to the death
penalty was a pacifist-mindset, which also made them resistant to war.154 These qualities
assigned the Quakers a fundamental role in actually limiting capital punishment in parts of
colonial America during the late eighteenth-century.155 Due in large part to Quaker influence,
Pennsylvania reformed its penal code, the first state to do so, dramatically reducing the number
of crimes which could be punished with death.156 So strong and known was the Quakers’
opposition to capital punishment during the late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century,
that one was considered lucky to get a Quaker on the jury in his capital case,157 and judges even
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went so far as to remove Quakers, sua sponte, out of fear that they would not be able to properly
perform their jobs as jurors.158 Thus, the Quaker’s opposition to the death penalty was no joke,
and in the years following the Constitution’s adoption, this staunch opposition to capital
punishment effected a divide between the Quakers and other religious groups.159
(4) The Catholics
At the time of the founding, the Catholics were small in number,160 and despised by
larger religious organizations such as the Puritans161 and Quakers.162 The tide of anti-Catholic
sentiments drove the majority of Catholics to settle in the supposed “Catholic-haven” of
Maryland.163 Maryland, founded by the Calverts,164 promised religious freedom to the
Catholics.165 This segregation was celebrated by the Virginia Council, who were primarily
Protestant, and did not wish to share land with Catholics.166
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There is not much to say about the founding-era Catholics’ views pertaining to the death
penalty, other than that the Catholic church has unequivocally taught for centuries that the death
penalty is appropriate for “the most serious crimes.”167
(5) The Jews
Similar to the plight of the Catholics, the Jews were also small in number at the time of
the founding.168 Accordingly, their views on capital punishment were not influential or
widespread, and difficult to ascertain. One would think that strong assumptions can be made on
the eighteenth-century Jewish stance on capital punishment through passages set forth in the
Mosaic Law in the Torah.169 It is well known that in more than one place, the Torah calls for
punishment for certain offenses by death, and even discusses the methods of death to be
employed for different offenses: strangulation, decapitation, burning, and stoning.170 However,
the Jewish and late federal Judge, Jack B. Weinstein, authored an article in the New York Law
Journal that stated, in pertinent part: “those who merely take a cursory glance at the Torah, with
its numerous transgressions seemingly carrying a sentence of death, miss the point.”171
According to Judge Weinstein—going as far back as biblical times—executions were an extreme
rarity in Jewish culture, due primarily to the fact that there were vast procedural protections in
place that limited and possibly even eliminated its application all together.172 The Mishnah
supports Judge Weinstein’s proposition, stating in one passage that “a Sanhedrin that executes
one person in seven years is considered bloodthirsty.”173 Moreover, prominent rabbis have stated
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that even executing one person in seventy years would be considered murderous.174 If one
couples this information with the fact that today only about 33% of Jews support capital
punishment,175 it is a safe assumption that the small body of eighteenth-century Jews would have
taken a Quaker-esque approach to the death penalty, favoring imprisonment and other
punishments over death.
(6) The Anglicans
While the Anglican presence was never robust in the northern colonies,176 and weak early
on in the southern colonies,177 the Anglican church reasserted itself in early eighteen-century
America in North Carolina, Virginia, and South Carolina, and to some extent, in New York.178
The death penalty was highly favored by the Anglicans during the eighteenth century.179
Anglicans, who can be considered “religious traditionalists,”180 “defended the retribution theory
of punishment that underlay capital punishment.”181 Anglican Clergy, the Church’s leaders,
directly supported capital punishment, and in doing so, rejected the views of other religious
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organizations such as the Quakers, who proffered doctrines of divine and human nature.182 The
basis for their unwavering support of capital punishment can be traced back all the way back to
the Thirty-Seventh Article of Faith, which is one of the traditional Thirty-Nine that the Church of
England adopted in 1563, as well as the English Parliament, eight years later, in 1571.183 The text
reads: “the Laws of the Realm may punish Christian men with death, for heinous and grievous
offences.”184 Notably, the text does not make capital punishment mandatory for certain offenses;
rather, it merely grants the State permission to impose the death penalty.185 This certainly did not
deter Anglicans from imposing the death sentence widely, and this provision from the ThirtySeventh Article is still in effect in the Anglican Church today.186
(7) The Baptists
The Baptists’ presence in Northeast America at the time of the founding is difficult to
measure, but the Great Awakening acted as a catalyst for substantial Baptist growth in the
southern colonies.187 During the revolutionary era, prominent Baptist leader Isaac Backus fought,
on behalf of the Baptists as a whole, for the disestablishment of religion.
Though there is scant information on the death penalty views of eighteenth-century
Baptists, there is data showcasing the modern-day Baptist position, which is staunchly in favor of
the death penalty.188 Baptists today are among the death penalty’s foremost supporters.189

182

Id. Despite Puritan hatred for Anglicanism, the communities’ joint support for capital punishment may be an area
of similarity.
183
David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the Death Penalty Internationally, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 295, 305
(2008).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Esbeck, supra note 133, at 1418. One example of this growth occurred in the town of Sandy Creek, North
Carolina, where revivals—in only three years—resulted in the planting of enough Baptist churches to form a Baptist
Association.
188
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 392 (2001).
189
Id.

27

Assuming this position did not drastically flip-flop in the last century or two, it is highly likely
that eighteenth-century Baptists felt similarly.
(8) The Deists
Deism at the time of the founding can be defined as “a heterogeneous ‘movement’ . . .
[which placed] much emphasis on natural religion,”190 where natural religion is the belief that
“knowledge of God is obtainable by human reason alone . . . .”191 Eighteenth-century deism
aligned with the Enlightenment, in that they both rejected mysticism and the concept of blind
faith, and instead advocated for scientific inquiry, reason, and truth.192 Many of the founding
fathers were deists, which is exemplified in the Declaration of Independence’s lack of any
reference to the bible, but direct reference to “Nature’s God” (rather than the Christian God).193
Because deism is more akin to a theistic stance and was not an organized religion at the time of
the founding (like the Quakers or the Puritans), there are minimal sources that allow for
inferences into their beliefs on the death penalty as a whole. Part IIIB, below, explores the death
penalty views of particular Founding Fathers who happened to be deists, which sheds more light
on deists’ views pertaining to the death penalty.
B. The Founders, their Religions, and their Views on the Death Penalty
This subpart identifies the religion of seven different Founders, and draws on explicit
references where available to discern their views on the death penalty. The seven men surveyed
were either involved in the drafting of the Eighth Amendment or outspoken about their views
pertaining to the death penalty. The trend in this section is of interest: though capital
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punishments were commonplace during eighteenth-century America, as clearly seen in part IIIA,
all Framers surveyed were “fascinated by the potential of penitentiaries and the viability of
alternatives to capital punishment,”194 and even condemned the death penalty, publicly. This
disparity is the cornerstone of this article’s findings as to the Clause’s original meaning.
(1) James Madison
James Madison was a deist.195 There are two primary pieces of historical evidence that
evince Madison’s disdain for capital punishment. Madison’s writings in the 1820s indicate that
he was attracted to “penitentiary discipline” instead of “the cruel inflictions so disgraceful to
penal codes.”196 Then, in 1823, Madison’s writings were even more explicit, stating that he
would “not regret a fair and full trial of the entire abolition of capital punishments by any State
willing to make it . . . .”197 There is therefore little doubt as to how he felt about the death
penalty: Madison would be content if no state ever subjected a defendant to death, again.
(2) Thomas Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson, like Madison, was a deist, and had doubts about the existence of
heaven.198 Jefferson was a forward-thinking Founding Father,199 personifying the ideal of the
Enlightenment.200 Accordingly, Jefferson was influenced by the writings of Cesare Beccaria,
writing that Beccaria “had satisfied the reasonable world of the unrightfulness and inefficacy of
the punishment of crimes by death.”201 In Virginia during the year of 1785, Jefferson attempted
to turn his views into a proposal that, if passed, would limit the imposition of executions to cases
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involving murder or treason—the proposal lost by a single vote.202 Such writings and attempted
legislation manifest that Jefferson supported the abolishment of the death penalty.
(3) Benjamin Franklin
Like Jefferson, Franklin was an “excellent example of the ‘enlightened’ man.”203
Franklin was also a deist,204 and explicitly questioned the death penalty’s propriety on more than
one occasion, asking, “To put a man to death for an offence which does not deserve death, is it
not murder?”205 He also railed against the practice of innocent individuals being “dragg’d into
noisome Dungeons, tortured with cruel Irons, and even unmercifully starv’d to Death.” Lastly,
Franklin also displayed his desire for penal reform by joining, along with William Bradford, the
“Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons.”206 Franklin’s ponderings
and close friendships with individuals such as Benjamin Rush207 indicate, at the very least, a
level of intolerance for the death penalty.
(4) Benjamin Rush
Benjamin Rush, like Jefferson and Franklin, was also a great example of an enlightened
man and Founding Father.208 Hailing from Philadelphia, Rush was a signer of the Declaration of
Independence, and a fervent Quaker.209
Rush often spoke of his faith in conjunction with his death penalty views.210 Exceeding
even the views of mainstream Quakerism as laid out above, Rush wrote boldly against the death
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penalty.211 In his published pamphlet, “Considerations on the Injustice and Impolicy of
Punishing Murder by Death,” Rush asserted that the death penalty was “contrary to reason,”212
and urged for incarceration and rehabilitation as replacements for execution.213 Rush asserted:
laws “which inflict death or murder, are, in my opinion, as unchristian as those which justify or
tolerate revenge; for the obligations of Christianity upon individuals, to promote repentance, to
forgive injuries, and to discharge the duties of universal benevolence, are equally binding upon
the states.”214 In March of 1787, Rush, while casually spending time with his friend Benjamin
Franklin, declared that capital punishment was inappropriate for any crime.215 There is therefore
no doubt as to Benjamin Rush’s views pertaining to the death penalty.
(5) Thomas Paine
Thomas Paine was, like many of the Founders, a deist.216 Paine was also an ardent deathpenalty abolitionist,217 and was in favor of totally dismantling the “state right to the death
penalty, except in exceptional circumstances of a threat to the life of the nation.”218 Paine
vehemently opposed the execution of Louis XVI, and “regretted the French Assembly’s vote to
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impose a death sentence.”219 Paine’s outspoken misgivings with the death penalty—he has
referred to the practice as “barbarous”—manifest a clear abolitionist mindset.220
(6) William Bradford
William Bradford was the United States’ second Attorney General.221 He was a close
friend of James Madison, who was his classmate in college.222 While little is known about his
religious views, in 1793, Bradford notably authored the essay, “An Enquiry How Far the
Punishment of Death is Necessary in Pennsylvania,” in which he proposed abolition of the death
penalty for every crime except murder.223 Not surprisingly, though, Bradford was “perfectly
willing to entertain the possibility that evidence might later show that the death penalty for that
crime was not an appropriate punishment either.” Thus, at the very least, Bradford was
supportive of abolishing the death penalty as a punishment for the majority of criminal offenses.
(7) Samuel Livermore
Samuel Livermore, a Founding Father and lawyer from Massachusetts,224 was a
Presbyterian.225 Livermore, who was involved in the drafting of the Eighth Amendment and its
debates, argued that as punishment technologies became more effective and humane over time,
such as the implementation of a modernized prison system, the death penalty would become
obsolete.226 Livermore was essentially suggesting that once it became unnecessary to implement

219

Bessler, supra note 1, at 210 (stating that Paine actually risked his own life during the course of his opposition to
Louis XVI’s execution).
220
Bessler, supra note 50, at 1936.
221
Id. at 1934.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
January 1790, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/01-06-02-0001-0001.
225
Representative Samuel Livermore, BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791,
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p1/members/reps/livermore.html.
226
Bessler, supra note 50, at 1934.
Livermore stated: “It is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having
their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a
more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be

32

the death penalty due to appropriate alternative punishments, it should be reconsidered or
abandoned.227 Livermore’s views on the death penalty were forward thinking and in-line with
abolishment and the views of other Founding Fathers, though possibly in tension with the
Federalist-tilting views of John Witherspoon and the Presbyterian Church to which Livermore
belonged.
(8) Notable Mentions
While not all Founding Fathers explicitly advocated for the abolition of the death penalty
like those above, and some such as John Jay and John Adams did not have as many moral
struggles with executions, they still expressed uncertainty in some circumstances.228 Others were
extremely direct in their abolitionist sentiments, such as James Wilson, who took pride in the fact
that the United States had less capital crimes in the books than those of England.229 Moreover,
respected military leaders who were also Founding Fathers desired to greatly slow the stream of
executions, including George Washington and Alexander Hamilton.230 The entirety of Founders
surveyed in this subpart expressed, at the very least, a degree of disdain for the death penalty.
C. Leading Orators and Influences
To more fully develop the contours of the religious landscape and the death penalty
during the time the Eighth Amendment was enacted, this section very briefly explores the
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religious views of three prominent, founding-era orators, George Whitefield, John Locke, and
Cesare Beccaria, and explores their influence on the public and Founding Fathers.
(1) George Whitefield
George Whitefield, an English clergyman and ordained Anglican priest, “became a leader
of the Methodist faction that was growing within the Church of England.”231 He conducted
innumerable public speaking stops through the colonies during the mid-eighteenth-century,
effectively preaching to crowds of Americans.232 Whitefield stressed a heartfelt experience,
salvation, and personal repentance,233 which accordingly shaped American religion.234 Though it
appears that Whitefield did not write explicitly on the death penalty, his ordainment as an
Anglican priest allows an inference to be drawn in accordance with the beliefs of eighteenthcentury Anglicans as whole, who passionately embraced capital punishment.235
(2) John Locke
Though on the unorthodox spectrum, John Locke was a “Christian and Biblicist.”236 The
Framers cited John Locke heavily.237 His influence on the Framers bleeds through heavily in the
Declaration of Independence, where, based on Lockian ideas, Thomas Jefferson discussed
“natural rights and the social compact, which formed the colonies’ justifications to the world to
break with Great Britain.”238 Locke thought the death penalty to be appropriate in certain
circumstances,239 as he stated that “each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with
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so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to
repent, and terrifie others from doing the like.”240 Thus, Locke felt the death penalty was
permissible for some crimes.
(3) Cesare Beccaria
Last, but most certainly not least: Cesare Beccaria, the “father of the abolitionist
movement.”241 Beccaria, a Catholic,242 rose to infamy through his short treatise, “On Crimes and
Punishments,”243 in which he argued for proportionality and the abolition of “state-sanctioned
executions,” which he believed brutalized societies.244 Beccaria’s breadth of influence was
enormous, particularly on the Founders.245 His work was admired by John Adams, Thomas
Jefferson, James Wilson, Benjamin Rush, John Hancock, William Bradford, and Thomas Paine,
to name a few.246 The Beccaria approach to the death penalty is simple: solving murder by death
is murder, and accordingly, absurd.247
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PART IV: THE PUBLIC-FOUNDER DICHOTOMY
Admittedly, this article has tossed a lot at its reader. In Part I it discussed the Eighth
Amendment’s history and ratification; in Part II it gave a statement of the modern scholarly
debate concerning the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning as it pertains to the death penalty;
and finally, in Part III, it presented a survey of the various religions that existed in eighteenthcentury America to unearth their views on the death penalty, as well as the views of the
Founding Fathers and some of the era’s leading orators. This section serves as a synthesis of
Parts IB, II, and III. Now that additional pieces of information have been presented which may
inform the original meaning debates, this section makes the ultimate inquiry: if the earlier
discussions and findings of this article were applied to the original meaning debates surrounding
the Eighth Amendment and the Death Penalty, would they change the constitutional or original
meaning analysis? Do they shed additional light, even an ever so slight light, on the debates, or
the proprietary of originalism? The answer is unequivocally “yes.”
As this article began to take shape, it was hard to predict what it might uncover. In Part
III, however, a fascinating dichotomy emerged between the American public as represented by
their various religions’ beliefs, and the views of the Founders. This dichotomy revealed that
depending upon one’s reference group in the original meaning analysis (i.e., the American public
as represented by their religions versus the Founders as represented by their religions and views),
the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment shifts, giving a new lens through which the
arguments of the different proponents of the debate, the traditional originalists and living
originalists, may be analyzed.
For example, in Part IIIA, the majority of the religions surveyed were huge proponents of
the death penalty. Though some supported it more than others, the eighteenth-century Puritans,
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Anglicans, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Catholics all viewed the death penalty as a permissible
form of criminal punishment to further deterrence, and sometimes even treated executions as
religious, social outings. Moreover, beyond the religious landscape, the public as a whole
supported the death penalty.248 In stark contrast, the group of Founding Fathers surveyed in this
article highly opposed the death penalty, and were primarily deist or nonreligious.249 Benjamin
Rush believed it to be unchristian, and contrary to reason; Jefferson passed legislation to try to
limit it; Madison wrote that he would be fine with total abolishment; Livermore believed it to be
antiquated and inferior to the penitentiaries of the future; Bradford was comfortable with total
abolishment; Franklin questioned the death penalty’s cruelty often, and desired to build modern
penitentiaries; Paine despised the death penalty, a view that put his life in jeopardy. Even the
Framers who supported the death penalty for certain crimes, such as John Adams or John Jay,
voiced their doubts, at times.
Though there is the question of why this dichotomy exists,250 the real question is: what
does it mean for the original meaning debates and corresponding analyses? Well, it could mean a
lot. As Part II hinted at, Scalia’s traditional originalists need a point of reference to support their
claims. Meaning, because the traditional originalists believe that the legal and social status of the
death penalty at the time of the founding must carry over to today, they must look to one of two
sources to support their contention: either the American public as a whole, or the men who wrote
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and enacted the Amendment, the Framers. Obviously, though, as the preceding paragraph and
Part III of this article manifested, the views of the Founders and religious public were drastically
different, which creates a fairly serious problem for the traditional originalists and their analysis.
Depending on which group they reference to determine the eighteenth-century propriety of the
death penalty, the result will be different. If one chooses the American public, which seemingly
must be the go-to choice of originalists (as indicated by their beliefs that the death penalty is
constitutional), they seem to be making a logical choice—by selecting the public as a whole,
which supported the death penalty more than not, the death penalty must also be permissible
today. Yet—by choosing the American public as a reference point, the traditional originalists are
neglecting the men who wrote and enacted the Amendment. Could Scalia and his traditional
originalists really intend to leave the Founders out of their analysis (or at least the large,
important group of Founders discussed in this article), who are arguably as important as (or
perhaps even more important than) the public? Moreover, by using both groups interchangeably,
the traditional originalists would be caught in a contradictory trap of views that don’t align.
This clear discrepancy appears to expose a flaw in Scalia’s traditional originalism. With
two equally important reference-groups that each possess fairly opposite views on the death
penalty, a tough decision must be made when conducting a traditional originalist analysis of the
Eighth Amendment as it pertains to the death penalty. This could tip the scales of the debate in
favor of the living originalists, or even non-originalism. If the traditional originalists cannot
resolve this discrepancy in their analysis, the living originalists’ claim that the death penalty
should be read to embody the abstract moral principles of each century begins to become more
valid, as they rely on the meaning that the enlightened and highly intellectual founders, alone,
sought to impart to the Amendment and the death penalty: a simple and vague prohibition of
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cruelty. The living originalists show proof that the language of the Amendment was carefully
selected to embody an abstract, moral principle,251 and therefore each generation can decide
whether they want to put fellow citizens to death for various offenses. This more “languagebased” analysis gives the living originalists credibility, as they do not need to pay any attention
to the public’s beliefs, as represented by their religions. Rather, they can give the Amendment
the meaning that they believe the Founders gave it. It is also possible that originalism,
“traditional” or “living,” is just is not necessary, and that modern society shouldn’t care what the
Eighth Amendment and the death penalty meant to the Framers or the public. At the very least, it
can be seen that there is a degree of misalignment between traditional originalism’s take on the
death penalty and the views of the Founders, with no easy explanation to rectify the discrepancy.
Now that this dichotomy has been presented, it is time to reflect on this article’s broader
theme: should religion and similar personal beliefs be a part of the legal original meaning
analysis? Maybe. This article initially set out to discover and potentially prove that religion
needs to be a part of the Eighth Amendment original meaning analysis. Its focus has since
shifted, and has primarily sought to provide evidence that religion is at least useful in conducting
a thorough determination of what the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause originally meant to the American public and the Framers, and how these findings affect
the original meaning debates. In the end, regardless of whether religion ought to play a part in
future discussions and debates on originalism, it has at least helped to unearth the dichotomy and
other findings, which will hopefully pave the way to break new ground in the original meaning
arena.
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CONCLUSION AND IDEAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This article has attempted to shed additional light on the original meaning of the Eighth
Amendment debates through canvassing the religions that existed at the time founding and
surveying the beliefs of the Founders. By synthesizing the article’s first three sections, Part IV
revealed an interesting dichotomy, manifesting a difference in what the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause meant to the enactors of the Eighth Amendment, versus what it meant to the
American public. This dichotomy potentially undermines traditional originalism, presenting
originalists with a choice between using as a reference-point either: (1) what the Eighth
Amendment and death penalty meant to the American public; or (2) what they meant to the
Framers. This perhaps shifts the debate towards the living originalists or even an abandonment of
originalism-type analyses altogether, and raises a plethora of questions.
In terms of further study, this article does not profess to crack the code of which side has
the “correct” original meaning—indeed, this article may have raised more questions than it
answered—but instead seeks to play a part as an enabler, to give other more devoted scholars an
additional perspective to consider in this puzzle. For example, what other major beliefs of
Americans, if any, could play a part in the original meaning analysis, and why should they play a
part? More specifically, scholars must try to resolve the traditional originalist discrepancy as to
which group the traditional originalists should rely upon as a reference-point, and why? Are
there robust justifications for choosing one group over the other? Can this article’s thesis be
rebutted, making such a choice unnecessary? This article serves as a preliminary investigation
into eighteenth-century religion, the Founders, and the death penalty, and hopes to facilitate
further, deeper discussions into traditional originalism versus living originalism, and the role of
religion, to finally determine which ought to prevail (or neither!).
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